For an event, like forming a true belief, to be lucky then it must be of some significance or value to an agent. Yet, if significance, as it has also been commonly thought, plays a role in determining the degree of luck (Pritchard and Smith, in New Ideas Psychol 22:1-28, 2004; Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485-503, 2011), then this leads to a result similar to (but not the same as) an absurd form of pragmatic encroachment. If this problem cannot be avoided, then anti-luck epistemology should be abandoned. However, this paper will argue that with proper considerations about the nature of luck according to at least one theory, no such problem arises.
Introduction
Although I intend to demonstrate that Ballantyne's argument fails against anti-luck epistemology, the major focus of the paper will beon the nature of luck-specifically B Lee John Whittington l.j.whittington@sms.ed.ac.uk 1 University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK the function of the significance/value condition for luck. Clarity on the nature of luck itself should not only be useful for proponents of anti-luck epistemology, but also to its detractors and those in other domains of inquiry where luck features heavily.
The significance condition for luck
With one exception (Pritchard and Smith 2004) , all theorists of luck have so far agreed that a significance or value (from now on, I will just use significance condition) condition is a necessary condition for luck. There are a couple of reasons for this.
The first is that significance appropriately attaches an agent to the relevant event (Pritchard and Smith 2004, p. 198 ). An event that affects no one is not a lucky event. For example, a landslide that affects no one is not considered lucky. In other words, luck is always agent involving. Pritchard (2014) questions whether this is really the case, and argues that in fact it is only our luck attributions that are agent involving, but that luck itself extends much further (ibid, 9). I won't go into that argument here, and I will assume the more popular view that luck always involves an agent. It's worth noting that if we agree with Pritchard then we have also countered Ballantyne's problem as for Pritchard there is no significance condition for luck on which Ballantyne's argument depends upon.
The second reason is that the significance condition allows us to state whether an agent has been subject to good or bad luck. It is not enough that a lucky event affects an agent. It must affect an agent in a good or bad way (Coffman 2007, p. 2) . For example, a mote of dust landing on my palm affects me (albeit in a minimal way), but not in a good or bad way. So the event of a mote of dust landing on my palm, even if the other conditions for luck hold, is a not case of luck (good or bad) for me. Again, we might question this. Suppose you've entered a large lottery and win. The prize, that has yet to be decided, is either a week long beach holiday or a week long stint in the local jail. We might argue that you have been lucky even before the prize has been decided simply in virtue of winning the lottery even though it is not yet a case of good or bad luck. 1 The luck is value neutral until the prize has been decided. Perhaps this is one way of thinking about luck in this case, where the value goes from neutral to positive or negative. Another way would be to think that the value is not yet determined until the prize has been decided. That is, it is not the case that the luck is neutral, rather, that we haven't found out the value yet. The latter explanation seems preferable, for if we were to concede that there were value neutral lucky events, then we would also have to concede that the mote of dust (given the other conditions for luck are met) landing on my palm is also a lucky event. This is counter-intuitive, so the former explanation would at least require an additional theoretical payoff compared to the latter in order to offset this counter-intuitiveness. It's difficult to see what the payoff might be, so we'll proceed assuming that lucky events always have a positive or negative value.
Significance here is also taken to be objective, in the sense that it does not depend entirely on the desires or perceptions of the agent in order to count as significant for that agent. Furthermore, the value of the significance may well be the opposite of what the agent perceives i.e. the agent may perceive something as bad for them whereas it is actually good for them, and vice versa. Ballantyne (2012) demonstrates this with the following example:
Imagine that Rex suffers from anorexia nervosa. He doesn't want to gain weight and so desires to forgo eating. By an unlikely accident, Rex's water faucet is connected to a tank filled with nutritional supplement. Rex drinks the water-like supplement and so maintains a healthy body weight, despite concerted efforts otherwise. A natural reaction is that Rex enjoys good luck. (Ballantyne 2012, p. 322) In this example, Rex's desires are frustrated but, if we agree with Ballantyne, Rex enjoys good luck. For this case, the desires of the agent go against what is actually good for them. There are two points to be made here. The first is that Rex does not know the facts about the situation, so does not perceive or judge that anything good or had has happened to him. Nevertheless something good has happened to him. So significance in this case does not depend on the agent believing that something significant has happened to them.
The second is that if Rex had been availed to the facts of the situation, then we might well expect him to be upset and make the assessment that he had been unlucky, but I doubt if this would change our assessment that he had enjoyed good luck. What Rex perceives to be good or bad for him is distorted, or lacks appropriate prioritisation. 2 So, even if an agent does believe that something good or bad has happened to them, this doesn't necessarily mean that something good or bad has actually happened to them. The upshot of both these points is that significance neither depends on an agent believing that what has happened to them is good or bad for them, nor does it require that they make the correct assessment as to whether something good or bad for them. In this sense, significance is something objective. 3 The third reason and the most important for this discussion is that significance has also been thought to play a role in measuring the degree of luck (Pritchard and Smith 2004; Ballantyne 2011 Ballantyne , 2012 Ballantyne , 2013 . Luck is a scalar notion in that one can be more or less lucky. For chanciness (or modal) accounts of luck, how lucky one is depends on how chancy the lucky event is [(in modal terms--how close by the nearest possible world in which the event also occurs holding fixed certain other states of the world (Pritchard 2005; Kallestrup and Pritchard 2012) ]. For lack of control accounts, the degree of which one significantly lacks control determines the degree of luck (although this is more difficult to determine than in chanciness accounts of luck). 4 However, despite the work done by the other conditions to this end, significance 2 Rex's psychological well being will probably be adversely affected, so in this sense, something bad has happened to him but, in this case at least, it looks as if Rex should prioritize his physical health over his psychological health. 3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to include this point. also seems to have a part to play. To make this clear, imagine two equally sized fair lotteries. In the first lottery, the winner receives $10. In the second, the winner receives $1 million. Intuitively, it seems as if the winner of the second lottery has been luckier than the winner of the first. Yet the odds are equal for both and the lack of control is equal for both. The only way to explain the difference is to cite the difference in significance. The winner of the second lottery is now significantly financially better off than the winner of the first. If this is right, then how significant the lucky event is can change the degree of which one is lucky.
One way we might dispute the thought that significance plays a role in determining the degree of luck is by suggesting that all that is required is that a minimum threshold of significance is met. 5 In other words, only the modal or lack of control conditions (or both perhaps, if you have a mixed account) determine the degree of luck. Significance has to be met, but once it is, it plays no further role. To this, we can provide a couple of responses.
The first is that if we hold the "threshold thesis", then we would have to state the winner of the first lottery is equally as lucky as the winner of the second lottery. This is counter intuitive so, again, it would require some extra theoretical payoff that offsets the counter-intuitiveness. It's not clear what this payoff would be. The force of this response can be amplified by increasing the extremity of the difference in significance between two equally likely events. If we compare death to the stubbing of a toe (Ballantyne 2013) while holding the likelihoods fixed and state that these are equally unlucky events, then the threshold thesis looks problematic.
The second response is that good lucky events and bad lucky events can be balanced against each other with either a neutralizing effect or an overall positive/negative effect (Ballantyne ibid) . For example, imagine that you unluckily lose $100 on Tuesday, yet on the same day luckily (with the same odds) win $100. Overall, the luck seems to have balanced itself out. You've come out of the day neither better nor worse off. However, imagine that, again with the same odds, you unluckily lose $100 on Wednesday, but luckily win $1 million on the same day. Overall it seems you have had a (good) lucky day. You are $9,999,900 richer. However, if we only use modal or lack of control conditions to measure the degree of luck, then the result will be that, on balance, you have come out equally as you have suffered one case of bad luck and one case of good luck at the same odds. According to the threshold thesis, both Tuesday and Wednesday went equally well in the luck department. This is also counter-intuitive, as it seems clear that Wednesday was a far luckier day for you. The only way to explain how Wednesday was a luckier day that Tuesday is to accept that significance plays a role in the degree of luck. You were luckier on Wednesday not because of the odds, but because you came out better off.
The role that significance has to play in determining the degree of luck is what Ballantyne's problem with anti-luck epistemology rests upon. We will go on to look at the problem in more detail now.
Footnote 4 continued fixed, not in nearby possible worlds, and that event is significant for the agent. I discuss further differences between the two accounts of luck in section IV. 5 Thanks to Duncan Pritchard for this suggestion.
The problem
All the current accounts of luck have been used in an attempt to illuminate certain problems in epistemology, particularly in the analysis of knowledge and the Gettier problem (Gettier 1963) . Anti-luck epistemologists have argued that at the core of Gettier and Gettier-like cases is a kind of knowledge precluding luck (Pritchard 2005; Riggs 2007; Kallestrup and Pritchard 2012) . Any adequate account of knowledge needs to both avoid counting Gettier and Gettier-like cases as examples of knowledge and explain why they are not cases of knowledge. An anti-luck condition attempts to do just this. According to anti-luck epistemologists, any account of knowledge requires an antiluck condition to avoid counting Gettier and Gettier-like cases as cases of knowledge. Furthermore, anti-luck epistemologists can explain why these examples are not cases of knowledge. It is because they involve a kind of knowledge precluding luck.
For example, consider Pritchard's (2005) Then take a standard Gettier case: A rambler comes to truly believe that a sheep is in the field in which she is standing. However, the rambler bases her belief on the sighting of a dog that just looks like a sheep. It just so happens that behind the dog is a real sheep. The rambler's belief is true, but it doesn't qualify as knowledge. Pritchard's account of lucky true belief can explain why the rambler's true belief fails to upgrade to knowledge. In a wide class of nearby possible worlds while holding relevant initial conditions fixed, there is no sheep in the field. The rambler's true belief is a lucky one, so does not count as knowledge. Building on this explanation, to exclude cases like the rambler from being cases of knowledge, it is necessarily required that our account of knowledge holds that knowledge is, at the very least, non-lucky true belief.
Pritchard's account is not the only account of how luck prevents knowledge (see Riggs 2007 for example) but I won't elaborate on the other accounts here. Instead we'll look at why Ballantyne holds that all these accounts are inadequate for providing a proper analysis of knowledge. Ballantyne (2013) argues that any anti-luck epistemology that uses an account of luck that includes the features of the significance condition expressed above will result in something similar to an absurd form of pragmatic encroachment. The argument goes as follows: A little more explanation is required. (A1) assumes that there is a level of luck that is acceptable for knowledge. The luck would be knowledge precluding if there was more of it. This reasoning is taken from Wayne Riggs who writes "Knowledge is not incompatible with luck full stop. It is incompatible with luck of certain kinds to a certain degree" (Riggs 2007, p. 330) . The argument uses this reasoning combined with the understanding that the significance condition plays a role in setting the degree of luck to demonstrate that it is possible to Gettierise an agent by increasing the significance of the belief formation event. By increasing the level of significance, the degree of luck is increased, pushing the agent over from being a knower to only being a lucky believer. This is without changing any of what might be considered the epistemically relevant facts about the situation. This, Ballantyne argues, is absurd.
The argument can also be run the other way, where instead of Gettierising an agent, we can de-Gettierise an agent by reducing the amount of significance attached to the belief formation event: B6 is absurd. (2013, p. 11) To see these arguments in action we'll consider some versions of the rambler Gettier case. In the first case, the rambler is slightly epistemically lucky in regards to forming the belief that there is a sheep in the field such that she does not know there is a sheep in the field. The rambler attaches some significance to knowing that there is a sheep in the field. In the second case, the rambler seems to be slightly epistemically lucky in regards to forming the belief that there is a sheep in the field. However, the rambler in this case attaches very little significance to knowing that there is a sheep in the field. The little significance that the rambler attaches to the true belief pushes the extent of the epistemic luck down to a level such that the rambler now knows that there is a sheep in the field. The second case is an example of what Ballantyne claims to be absurd. There are no differences between the first and second rambler other than the significance they attach to knowing the true belief but, if Ballantyne is correct, then anti-luck epistemology will predict that the first does not know and the second does know. And this, it is claimed, is absurd.
(B1) Suppose that degree of knowledge-precluding luck D for the event of having a true belief that proposition p is just enough to prevent knowledge. (B2) Suppose that some thinker has a true belief that p that is lucky to degree D. (B3) So, the thinker does not have knowledge that p. (B4) Reduce the degree of luck slightly below D by diminishing the magnitude of the significance of the event. Call the resulting degree of luck D-minus. (B5) Degree of luck D-minus is not enough luck to prevent knowledge of p (given that D is just enough to do so). (B6) So, the thinker's true belief that p is not lucky enough to be prevented from being knowledge. (BC) But
An initial response might be to deny (AC) and (BC). That is, deny the claim that the significance condition affects an agent's position to know leads to absurdity. Several philosophers working on epistemological contextualism (DeRose 2002; McGrath 2007, 2009 ) have argued that non-epistemic factors can play a role in an agent's position to know. 7 This is known as pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. This idea is perhaps best represented in DeRose's Bank case:
Bank Case A (Low Stakes). My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, "Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays." I reply, "No, I know it'll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon."
Bank Case B (High Stakes). My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, "Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?" Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, "Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure." (DeRose 2002, p. 913) According to Fantl and McGrath (2009) , despite the same amount of evidence in case A as there is in case B, in case A, DeRose truly attributes knowledge to himself whereas in case B, DeRose truly denies that he has knowledge (2002, p. 37) . The affective differences between whether DeRose is in a position to know or not in case A and B are the differences in the practical stakes in A and B for DeRose. In case A, the stakes are low as DeRose's financial stability does not hang in the balance, so DeRose can truly state that he knows that P. In case B the stakes are high as DeRose's financial stability does hang in the balance, so DeRose can truly state that he does not know P. In summary, according to Fantl and McGrath, practical stakes (which are non-epistemic factors) can play a role in whether an agent knows that P.
However, even if pragmatic encroachment is correct, there are some important differences between pragmatic encroachment and the consequences of Ballantyne's argument. In the case offered by DeRose and in similar cases offered by Fantl and McGrath (2002) , the pairs of examples are differentiated by the practical differences in stakes, often to an extreme degree. We should understand practical stakes here as dif-ferences that affect the agent's wellbeing, or something to a similar tune. For example in the bank case B, if DeRose gets it wrong, then his life will be severely affected. Yet regarding significance in Ballantyne's argument, the significance of an event does not have to be practical significance. We only have to raise the value of the belief formation event in some normative domain in order to increase the significance of the event. For example, we could raise the significance of the belief formation event by increasing the aesthetic value that the agent attaches to forming the true belief. Although it may be plausible that adjusting the practical stakes of having a true belief may affect the agent's position to know, it is extremely implausible that adjusting the aesthetic value that an agent attaches to having a true belief should affect whether the agent knows that P. This is a result that even a proponent of pragmatic encroachment is unlikely to accept.
By these lights, it is a mistake to think that Ballantyne's argument leads to pragmatic encroachment. Rather it leads to a much broader "value encroachment". This is due to the fact that the significance condition in accounts of luck does not only cover pragmatic value, but all other kinds of value, depending on how the condition is formulated. Value encroachment then, would be where any value associated with the true belief (in whatever normative domain of our choosing e.g. aesthetic, moral, epistemic, pragmatic, subjective wellbeing etc.) affects the agent's position to know. This most certainly would lead to absurdity in certain cases -consider again the aesthetic value that an agent attaches to a true belief and how it would be absurd to hold that this would affect whether this true belief was knowledge or not -so the conclusions (AC) and (BC) hold.
As a final note on the argument, a further problem generated is that it works inversely to our intuitions about valuing knowledge and becoming good learners. If Ballantyne's argument is correct, then the anti-luck epistemologist should prescribe the following advice -to become a better learner, 8 then you need to reduce the value you attach to gaining knowledge. If an agent reduces the significance that they attach to gaining true beliefs then they are more likely to know the target proposition as the lower the significance attached to the true belief, the lower the amount of potentially knowledge precluding luck. This seems equally absurd. Our advice to those that we want to become better learners is to value gaining knowledge more, not less. So not only does Ballantyne's argument lead to absurdity in terms of value encroachment for anti-luck epistemology, but leads to a corollary absurdity in terms of the kind of advice we would provide to those who wish to become better knowers. Now that we've looked at the problem, we can begin to consider a possible solution.
Another reason for significance
So far we have set out three reasons for a significance condition for luck. I want to suggest another reason for the significance condition: The significance condition captures the normative domain in which the luck is being ascribed. For shorthand, we'll call this (4). The thought here is that an agent can be lucky in a variety of different ways in different normative domains. An agent can be morally lucky, epistemically lucky, artistically lucky (Bertinetto 2013) , lawfully lucky etc. To be clear on which normative domain we are ascribing the luck to, we can state in what way the luck has been significant for the agent. An event E is artistically lucky for only if E is artistically significant for S. So a first stab modal account of artistic luck would be something like -E is artistically lucky for S iff E occurs in the actual world but not a wide set of nearby possible worlds and E is artistically significant for S.
This claim about the significance is compatible with most accounts of significance offered by philosophers of luck (Rescher 1995; Coffman 2007; Ballantyne 2012) even if it isn't explicitly alluded to. However there are two motivations for being explicit about the normative domain in which the luck is being ascribed.
The first motivation for (4) is that it allows us to make sense of how the same event may be lucky for an agent in different ways. For example, imagine that your rich uncle, who you were fond of, accidentally loses his life and bequeaths you $1 million. To make sure it's a case of luck, we can make the case such that if the uncle had died a day earlier or later then, for whatever reason, you would not have received the money. In one normative domain, you have been unlucky (perhaps the domain of wellbeing). You have lost an uncle who you were fond of. However, in the financial normative domain, you have been extremely lucky. 9 You are now a millionaire.
The second motivation for (4) is that determining the normative domain of which the luck is being ascribed is essential for making sense of certain kinds of luck. Consider a crude stab at a lack of control account of luck version of resultant moral luck (the luck where an agent may be more or less morally bad on the basis of the results of their actions):
(RL1) S is resultantly morally luck in regards to event E only if (1) the consequences of E are significantly beyond their control and (2) the consequences of E are significant for S.
Here is an example-two men are throwing stones off a bridge onto a very busy road with the intention of hitting the cars below (E). Every time the first man, who we'll call Blue, throws a stone off the bridge it hits a car. Every time the second man, who we'll call Red, throws a stone off the bridge, it narrowly misses hitting a car. Red has been morally lucky. It is beyond his control that his stones are narrowly missing the cars. We will have to concede that Red is at least less morally reprehensible than Blue, as Red hasn't actually hit any cars. 10 For Red, the conditions (1) and (2) are 9 This doesn't mean that the different "significances" cancel each other out or add to one another. Adding and subtracting different kinds of significance is like adding and subtracting apples from oranges. Instead, we should think that depending on how we view the event we have either been lucky or unlucky. 10 Many will not share this intuition at all. Believing in resultant moral luck depends on some consequentialist leanings. So long as the results of an action bear some role in determining the moral value of an action, then Red will be less morally reprehensible than Blue on the basis that he has actually committed less morally bad action. met-the consequences of his throwing the rocks off the bridge are largely beyond his control and the fact he hasn't actually hit anyone is morally significant for him.
However, there are at least two major problems with (RL1). The first is that it is too broad in scope. Rather the identifying the specific features of moral luck, (RL1) could be applied to any case of luck if we hold a lack of control theory of luck. For example, it is unlucky for me that I stubbed my toe. (RL1) will identify this as a case of moral (bad) luck. It is beyond my control that I stubbed my toe and the consequences of stubbing my toe are significant for me (it hurt). Yet it is not morally significant that I stubbed my toe. The case as it is described has nothing to do with morality. (RL1) requires some feature that specifically identifies a case of moral luck as being in the ethical normative domain.
The second related major problem is that (RL1) may predict the wrong results for Red and Blue. In the example, Red has been subject to a case of moral good luck. He has luckily committed a less bad act than Blue. However, imagine that each time Red misses a car, Blue chastises him and this hurts his feelings. As there is nothing in (RL1) to identify the morally relevant aspects of the example, we might easily state that Red has been subject to bad luck for, every time he misses a car, his psychological well being is adversely affected. If (RL1) was an account of moral luck, then it would be possible to identify Red as being morally unlucky even though the opposite is clearly the case-Red has been subject to moral (good) luck as he has not committed an equally bad act as Blue through factors beyond his control.
We can solve both of these problems by adding that the significance condition for moral luck is a moral significance condition. In which case we get: (RL2) S is resultantly morally luck in regards to event E only if (1) the consequences of E are significantly beyond their control and (2) the consequences of E are morally significant for S. (RL2) avoids the two problems above. The scope of the account has been narrowed such that it will not include cases of stubbing toes as being morally lucky and it will correctly predict that Red has been subject to moral good luck as it will be the moral value of the consequences that determine the positive or negative value of the luck i.e. whether the agent has been lucky or unlucky. This is not to say that (RL2) is a definitive account of moral luck (it definitely is not), but demonstrates the requirement for using the significance condition to explicitly state the normative domain of the luck we are talking about. Therefore we should accept (4).
Epistemic significance
With the acceptance of (4), we can move on to look at epistemic luck specifically and provide the first half of a counter argument to Ballantyne's argument against anti-luck epistemology. When talking about epistemic luck, we are in the epistemic normative domain, so when talking about epistemic luck we need to talk about epistemic significance. That is, S's true belief is lucky only if S's true belief is epistemically significant.
What does it mean to be epistemically significant? The quick answer is that for something to be epistemically significant then it must be of epistemic value. This raises the question as to what we mean by epistemic value or even by "epistemic".
The first point on epistemic value is that it is important to make the distinction between epistemic value and the value of the epistemic. By epistemic value, I shall mean that which is valuable in the epistemic normative domain. This is distinctive from questions about the value of the epistemic in general. This distinction is not new and can be found in Sosa (2007) and Hazlett (2013) . An analogy might help here. We should treat blade of grass counting value and the value of counting blades of grass as two distinctive categories. When discussing the former, we are asking questions about what is good for counting grass. There might be certain tools that are good for counting blades of grass and there might be certain character traits that make for a good grass blade counter. In other words, things that are of blade of grass counting value are things that are good for counting blades of grass. However, when discussing the latter, we are asking questions about the value of counting blades of grass. Is it a waste of time counting blades of grass? Is it good for anyone? Etc. There is no necessary connection between these two lines of inquiry. Even if we conclude that counting blades of grass is a valueless activity, that doesn't mean that there are not things that are of no value for counting blades of grass. By the same lights, epistemic value and the value of the epistemic should be treated distinctly. Now we need a definition of epistemic. I will operate with Allan Hazlett's definition of the epistemic:
(1) Definition of the "epistemic": The fundamental standard of the critical domain of the epistemic is cognitive contact with reality where this is finally and intrinsically valued." (Hazlett 2013, p. 268) However, I will make two slight adjustments to Hazlett's account.
(2) Definition of the "epistemic": The fundamental standard of the critical domain of the epistemic is cognitive contact with reality where this is treated 11 with final and/or intrinsic value.
There might be a further worry that the definition provided by Hazlett includes the term being defined (epistemic), so for the further sake of clarity we can express the definition as follows:
(3) Definition of the "epistemic":The critical domain where cognitive contact with reality is treated with final and/or instrumental value. 12 The adjustments slightly weaken the definition. I have changed the account to state that cognitive contact with reality is only treated as if it were finally or intrinsically valuable. This makes it the case that cognitive contact with reality does not necessarily have to be objectively intrinsically or finally valuable (it may be the case that cognitive contact with reality is overall bad for an agent), but within the domain of the epistemic, it is treated as such. 13 The second adjustment is to slightly weaken the kind of value that cognitive contact with reality is required to be treated with. As long as it is treated with final or intrinsic value, that should be enough. There is no reason to have to treat it with both.
In case the reader has further reservations about this definition; all that is required for our understanding of epistemic for the following argument to work is that the epistemic aims at/values/is motivated 14 towards cognitive contact with reality or truth (call this "being truth orientated"). Some version of this is either explicitly or implicitly held by many epistemologists. For example, Plantinga writes in regards to positive epistemic status: "by one's cognitive faculties working properly, or working according to the design plan insofar as that segment of the design plan is aimed at producing true beliefs" (1988, p. 39); Bonjour writes: "What makes us cognitive beings at all is our capacity for belief, and the goal of our distinctively cognitive endeavors is truth" Bonjour (1985, p. 7); Alston: "Epistemic evaluation is undertaken from what we might call the "epistemic point of view." That point of view aims at maximizing truth and minimizing falsity" (1985, p. 83) and : "The simplest way to describe the motivational basis of the intellectual virtues is to say that they are all based in the motivation for knowledge. They are all forms of the motivation to have cognitive contact with reality, where this includes more than what is usually expressed by saying that people desire truth." (1996, p. 167 ). Hazlett's amended definition, although not the same as the above, also captures the general thought that the epistemic is truth orientated in that it aims at/values/is motivated towards cognitive contact with reality. This is the definition I will continue with, although the reader is welcome to substitute it with their preferred understanding, so long as their understanding is truth orientated. 15 With Hazlett's definition in hand we can state that questions about epistemic value are questions about what is good for gaining cognitive contact reality and questions about the value of the epistemic are questions about what the good of gaining cognitive contact with reality is. For example, we might think that living in Nozick's (1974) experience machine would be just as good as living in the real world-but in the experience machine, there is no cognitive contact with reality. If the lives are equally good in terms of welfare, then having cognitive contact with reality adds nothing to an agent's welfare. This would be a question about the value of the epistemic, rather than a question of epistemic value. Here however, we will only be concerned with epistemic value as that is the measure of epistemic significance. In the same way that it does not matter if counting blades of grass is a valueless activity, if it turns out that gaining cognitive contact with reality is not objectively intrinsically, finally or instrumentally valuable, this will have no bearing on what is of epistemic value.
If the above is agreeable, then the epistemic value of a thing is the degree of which that thing is good for gaining cognitive contact with reality. Since Gettier (1963), we might disagree over which epistemic states, such as justification or evidence, are good for achieving this state. However, all I will assume here is that true belief is at the very least necessarily required for cognitive contact with reality. Without the belief, there is no contact. Without the truth, there is no reality. 16 If that is right, then true belief is at least 17 instrumentally epistemically valuable, as it is required for us to attain cognitive contact with reality. I am making an assumption here that anything that is necessarily required to achieve something of final or intrinsic value is itself at least instrumentally valuable. Again, it is important to note that this does not mean that true belief has some separate instrumental value outside of the epistemic normative domain. It could be the case that all true beliefs are instrumentally useless in some more general sense. If true beliefs never helped us get about in the world or never adding anything of value to our lives, this would still have no bearing on their instrumental value in the epistemic normative domain insofar as they are necessary for attaining cognitive contact with reality. They are always epistemically instrumentally valuable, not necessarily instrumentally valuable in general.
Returning back to the problem set by Ballantyne, the first move to make is to hold that true belief is, at least, always epistemically instrumentally valuable. That is, true belief is, at least, always instrumental in attaining cognitive contact with reality. It follows that true beliefs are always epistemically significant as they are always of epistemic value. Ballantyne anticipates how this could be developed into an objection: Suppose, as some philosophers have argued, that having a true belief is always significant for a thinker to some degree, no matter its content (see Lynch 2004; Kvanvig 2008b ). Thus, the "base-level" significance of a true belief can't be diminished without also changing that belief's truth-value. But then it's curtains for the argument. To see why, assume that degree of luck D is partly fixed by the base-level significance of the thinker's true belief along with facts about other necessary conditions for luck-for example, the magnitude of the Modal Condition. B4 says that we can reduce the degree of luck from D to Dminus just by diminishing the magnitude of the true belief's significance. But B4 is false: it is impossible to reach degree Dminus by diminishing the magnitude of the true belief's significance without making that belief false. To move from D to Dminus, we need to give the thinker a false belief. And so we cannot "de-Gettierise" a true belief by diminishing its significance." (2013, p. 12) Ballantyne responds to this objection with two arguments. The first argument is that the claim that true belief is always significant for the thinker is a controversial one. Anti-luck epistemologists could always make a concession to the controversial thesis, but this would provide room for a different analysis of knowledge that avoids this thesis.
The distinction between epistemic value and the value of the epistemic has been an attempt to navigate past the controversial thesis. If the claim about the value of true beliefs is that they are always of some value outside of the epistemic domain, then the claim is controversial as it is not obvious how certain true beliefs-such as true beliefs about the number of motes of dust on my desk-could have any value outside the normative domain of the epistemic. However, the way I have setup the value of true beliefs is that they are only always of value in the epistemic domain (as defined) and are perhaps only instrumentally valuable within that domain. Given that when we are making ascriptions of epistemic luck, we need to contextualise the significance condition to mean epistemic significance. The epistemic domain is the only domain we are interested in here. So in any case of epistemic luck where there is a true belief, there will always be some epistemic value. Perhaps this claim is still controversial, but this understanding of the value of true belief avoids certain problems. We might worry that some true beliefs are uninteresting (valueless outside of the domain of the epistemic) or even bad for us (of negative value outside of the domain of the epistemic), but this is not a worry here as we are only dealing with the value of true beliefs within the domain of the epistemic. One worry that may remain is that this understanding of the value of true belief relegates the "normative thrust" of the epistemic such that considerations of other goods should always come above gaining in epistemic goods. However this understanding of the epistemic good simply remains agnostic in regards to the value of true belief outside of the domain of the epistemic. These worries are worries about the value of the epistemic, rather than what is of epistemic value.
The second argument offered by Ballantyne against the objection is that even if true belief is always epistemically valuable, this value can still come in degrees. All that is required for Ballantyne's argument to work is that we can adjust the degree epistemic significance such that we can adjust the degree of luck. If we can reduce the epistemic significance, we can reduce the epistemic luck and in turn we can deGettierise an agent. If we can increase the epistemic significance, we can increase the epistemic luck and in turn, we can Gettierise an agent. There is nothing in the above that prevents epistemic value from coming in degrees.
It is possible that some true beliefs improve our cognitive contact with reality more than others. Perhaps a true belief for one agent that contributes more to that agent's general understanding of the world or can be linked with some of our other true beliefs in an interesting way increases that agent's cognitive contact with reality more than the same true belief for a different agent that does not have the same amount of relevant background beliefs. For example, a physicist discovering a new law of nature will have a relevant set of background beliefs such that learning that new law not only increases their knowledge via acquiring a fact or set of facts exclusively about that new law, but also will allow them to make connections between the new facts and the old ones, so increasing their general understanding about the physical universe as a whole. However, if I were to learn the new law and given that I do not have a large set of background beliefs concerning physics, then although I will have learned new facts exclusively about that new law, I will not have gained any further knowledge about how the new law relates to other facts in physics. So although both the physicist and I have learned the same fact or same set of facts, this new knowledge for the physicist increases their cognitive contact with reality more than it has for me. The result is that, even though the same fact or set of facts have been learned, it is easier for the physicist to be epistemically lucky in a knowledge precluding way than it is for me to be epistemically lucky in a knowledge precluding way, and may be due entirely to how epistemically significant the belief is for each of us. 18 I won't argue with Ballantyne here. It seems correct that we can adjust the epistemic significance of a belief by adjusting facts about the believer. The only difference between adjusting "general significance" and epistemic significance is the kind of facts we need to change about the agent in order to create a variation in epistemic significance between two agents holding the same belief. For the former, we might change their personal preferences and desires, for the later we only need to change the set of relevant background beliefs such that learning a new fact will increase their cognitive contact with reality more than an agent who does not have those background beliefs. However, the claim that all true beliefs are epistemically significant is only the first step to our solution.
Knowledge precluding luck
The second step to our solution lies in questioning the assumption that there can be degrees of knowledge precluding luck. Premises A1 and A2 of Ballantyne's argument require that it is possible that an agent can be epistemically lucky to such a lesser degree that their true belief would still qualify as a case of knowledge. By manipulating the degrees of significance, we can manipulate the degree of epistemic luck and it is this that allows for the absurd conclusion that we can Gettierise an agent by changing the amount of significance attached to the belief.
The notion that there can be varying degrees of epistemic luck comes from Riggs:
We frail and causally inept humans are never 100 % responsible for anything we 'accomplish,' so any theory that requires the total absence of luck for knowledge is a recipe for instant skepticism… Knowledge is not incompatible with luck full stop. It is incompatible with luck of certain kinds to a certain degree." (2007, p. 330) The argument is that in order to completely exclude luck, we would have to be fully responsible for our actions. As it is impossible to be fully responsible for our actions, it is impossible to fully exclude luck. This applies for beliefs. If what is required of our 18 This argument depends on a commitment to atomism about the content of beliefs such that both the physicist and I have the same belief. Conversely, holists about the content of belief will state that the physicist and I have different beliefs due to the different relationship with our background beliefs. If holism turns out to be correct, then the argument against Ballantyne could effectively be concluded here. If having different levels epistemic significance necessarily requires that the beliefs in question are different, then it would be impossible vary the levels of epistemic significance for the same belief. Ballantyne's argument would be unable to make the adjustment of significance moves that it requires to reach its conclusion. In other words, shifting our commitments about belief content will not help Ballantyne's argument. Thanks to Joey Pollock for suggesting that I talk about this.
beliefs to count as knowledge requires a full exclusion of epistemic luck, then none of our beliefs would ever qualify as knowledge. Scepticism is not an acceptable result, so we need to allow some degree of luck to play a role in our belief formation. If we do not accept that there can be some degree of epistemic luck that does not prevent a belief from qualifying as knowledge, then none of our beliefs would ever qualify as knowledge.
Yet there is an implicit assumption within this line of argument that needs to be brought out. The assumption is that this argument is operating with a theory of luck that requires full responsibility of the agent in order to exclude luck from occurring. Such a theory closely resembles a lack of control theory of luck, especially if we hold that there is a close link between agent control and responsibility. A lack of control account of luck looks as follows:
Event E is lucky for S iff (1) E is significantly beyond S's control and (2) E is significant for S (Lackey 2008, p. 260) .*** However, the most prevalent theory of luck used in epistemology has been Pritchard's (2005) Here is the epistemological variant:
S's true belief that P is lucky iff (1) S's forms the belief that P in such a way that the belief is true in the actual world but, holding relevant conditions fixed, would not be true in nearby possible worlds and (2) E is epistemically 19 significant for S.
This account of luck does not depend on the agent having full responsibility over their actions or their belief in order to exclude luck, but rather that the event in question could have easily been otherwise. To clearly set out the differences: If we think that control plays a necessary role in responsibility 20 and anything but full responsibility for an action will count that action as partially lucky then at least some versions of a lack of control account of luck will count a considerable amount of events, to some degree, as lucky-including our true beliefs. Luck, according to the modal account, will be less ubiquitous, as only the events that could have easily been otherwise (holding the relevant conditions fixed) will count as lucky. This includes many events that are beyond our control, but nevertheless affect us in positive or negative ways.
Regarding modal epistemic luck, there is also no degree of epistemic 21 luck that would not count as knowledge precluding. What is necessary for the epistemic luck to occur is sufficient to prevent knowledge. That is, the belief being formed in such a way that it could have easily been otherwise-which is necessary for the belief being epistemically lucky-is also enough to prevent the true belief from becoming knowledge. That is not to say that some true beliefs are more or less epistemically lucky than others. The distance between the actual world where the belief is true and the nearest possible world in which the belief is also true may vary depending on how the belief was formed, but in any case where the belief is true in the actual world, but would fail to be true in nearby possible worlds, that belief will always be epistemically lucky. 22 The answer for how much luck is required in order to count as knowledge precluding for the modal theorist is-"any amount of luck". This is not to say that a modal account of epistemic luck does not allow for varying degrees of knowledge-precluding luck. Some lucky true beliefs may be luckier than others. However, according to the modal account of epistemic luck, any degree of epistemic luck is enough to preclude knowledge.
The modal theory of luck avoids the scepticism challenge as the requirements for a belief being lucky are more difficult to attain than only being beyond one's responsibility or control. Only those beliefs that could have easily been false will count as lucky beliefs. This leaves most true beliefs intact as they will fail to meet the conditions for being lucky at all. If there is a problem of scepticism that requires a theory of epistemic luck to allow for non-knowledge precluding levels of epistemic luck, then this is a problem for lack of control theorists of luck, not modal theorists of luck.
We might think that if any degree of knowledge-precluding luck prevents an agent from knowing that P, then Ballantyne's argument fails from the outset. For argument A at premise (A1), we cannot suppose that the degree of knowledge precluding luck for the event of having a true belief that P is not enough, but nearly enough, to prevent knowledge that P. For argument B at premise (B5), we cannot suppose that the level of knowledge precluding luck has been reduced to a small extent such that it no longer precludes knowledge. However, even if we are to adopt a modal theory of epistemic luck, this still does not fully solve a variant of Ballantyne's argument. Consider the following: (C1) Suppose that degree of knowledge-precluding luck D for the event of having a true belief that proposition pis just enough to prevent knowledge. (C2) Suppose that some thinker has a true belief that pthat is lucky to degree D. (C3) So, the thinker does not have knowledge that p. (C4) Reduce the degree of luck completely by diminishing the magnitude of the significance of the event of having a true belief that p to zero. Call the resulting degree of luck D-minus. (C5) Degree of luck D-minus is not enough luck to prevent knowledge of p(as now, due to no significance, there is no luck at all). (C6) So, the thinker's true belief that pis not lucky enough to be prevented from being knowledge. (CC) But C6 is absurd. 23 In this version of the argument, we can adjust whether an agent has knowledge by reducing the amount of significance of the true belief to nil. This move reduces the level epistemic luck entirely by removing the epistemic luck altogether. Although adopting the modal account of luck will prevent there ever being a non-knowledge precluding amount of luck, it will not prevent the move of removing luck entirely by removing one of the necessary conditions for luck-the significance condition. The result is the same as in Ballantyne's original argument-that by adjusting the level of significance we can affect whether an agent is in a position to know that P and that this result is absurd. So even by rejecting the assumption that there can be acceptable levels of epistemic luck, the problem that anti-luck epistemology leads to absurd conclusions persists.
The two part solution and conclusion
The C1-CC argument is the only version of the Ballantyne's argument that resists the notion that any level of epistemic luck is sufficient for preventing knowledge. However, this argument depends on an assumption about the epistemic value of true beliefs that was rejected in section V. That is, it depends on some true beliefs having no epistemic value. This assumption is required as, if true beliefs always had some epistemic value, then it would be impossible to reduce the level of significance to nil.
However, in section V, I have shown that all true beliefs at least have instrumental epistemic value in that they are instrumentally required in order to have cognitive contact with reality. We cannot reduce the epistemic significance of having a true belief that P to nothing, as all true beliefs have some epistemic value. C4 in the argument is necessarily false.
To put the two part solution together, the part of the solution in section VI has falsified premise A1 in version A1-AC and B5 in version B1-BC, as there can be no level of non-knowledge precluding epistemic luck. That is, if we operate with a modal account of luck then any level of knowledge precluding luck will prevent knowledge. A modal account also avoids the claim that if any level of knowledge precluding luck prevents knowledge then this leads to scepticism. This is due to very few true beliefs counting as lucky when assessed according to a modal account of luck.
This only leaves argument C1-CC which is falsified by the arguments provided in section V as the epistemic significance of a true belief can never be reduced to nothing. Although both parts of the solution fail to solve the problem by themselves, when taken together, all the versions of Ballantyne's argument fail to be sound.
What was required to save anti-luck epistemology from this line of argument was to understand the kind of value that the significance condition when applied to epistemic luck was capturing, and the adoption of a modal account of luck. With these in tow, anti-luck epistemology avoids the absurd conclusions of the arguments presented. That is not to say that there may not be other reasons to believe that luck does not play a role in understanding the nature of knowledge, rather that the significance condition for luck creates no problems for the place of luck in epistemology. However, a better understanding of the nature of luck and, in particular, the significance condition for luck, should be useful not only for anti-luck epistemologists and their detractors, but others working on areas where luck features heavily.
In conclusion, the paper has argued that the significance condition for luck does not lead to absurd conclusions for anti luck epistemologists. To do this I have first shown that true beliefs are always epistemically valuable and then shown that any level of knowledge precluding luck prevents knowledge. Although neither of these observations alone can overcome the problem that Nathan Ballantyne has provided, when combined the problem is overcome. If my arguments are correct, then the significance condition for luck is no barrier for its place in epistemology.
